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The money demand function is one of the most 
closely studied relationships in economics. One 
reason is that the question of the stability of 
money demand has long been central to issues 
of  monetary theory. This largely reflects the 
influential restatement of the quantity theory of 
money by Milton Friedman (1956): "The quan- 
tity theory is in the first instance a theory of 
money demand." Further, he argued, "The quan- 
tity theorist accepts the empirical hypothesis that 
the demand for money is highly stable-more 
stable than functions such as the consumption 
function that are offered as alternative key 
relations." 
Friedman did not specify precisely the mean- 
ing of "highly stable" or "more stable." Presum- 
ably, highly stable implies that the parameters of 
the money iterlland function do not change over 
time. Thus, one would expect that any reasona- 
ble specification of money demand might satisfy 
some sort of  in-sample stability test (for exam- 
ple, Chow test) at a minimum. The notion that 
money demand is more stable than other "key" 
relationships has been interpreted in the context 
of a simple IS-hI\/I  framework by Poole (1970). In 
essence, "more stable" implied that the variance 
of the money demand function was relatiijeLy 
smaller than the variance of the IS  curve. 
For years, the question of stability was simply 
examined by estimating various specifications of 
money demand, including both long-run and 
short-run models. It was commonly affirmed that 
money demand was a function of relatively few 
variables, including income and interest rates. By 
the mid- 1970s,  a consensus seemed to emerge 
that money demand was indeed one of the more 
stable relationships in economics, reliable enough 
to sen7e  as a basis for formulating monetarypolicy. 
Unfortunately, just as a consensus seemed to 
develop, many of the estimated relatiofiships 
broke down, first around 1974, and again around 
1982. By  the mid-1980s,  it appeared as though 
many economists had given up on finding a 
specification of money demand that might be 
stable, in either the short or the long run. 
Recently, however, several researchers have 
found evidence that some specifications of 
money demand have remained stable thrctugh 
events of  the 1970s and 1980s. One common 
conclusion of these studies is that money demand 
is highly interest sensitive-more so than many 
economists previously thought, particularly in 
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the long run. The magnitude of the interest elas- 
ticity of money demand has important implica- 
tions for the role of moiley in the economy and 
hence for the conduct of monetary policy. 
Much of the early debate about the role of 
Inoney centered on how interest rates affected 
the velocity of money. Some analysts argued that 
interest-rate changes had little effect on velocity 
in the short or long run. Moreover, some pre- 
sumed that MI  velocity had an inherent trend 
growth rate of about 3 percent. Tllese assump- 
tions now appear to be clearly refuted by the 
experience of the 1980s. 
This paper reviews some recent findings of 
the research on money demand and considers 
the implications of these findings for monetary 
policy and rules. Section I reviews briefly a 
common specification of Ml dema~ld  that misled 
many economists about the i~nportance  of inter- 
est rates. Section I1  exami~les  recent evidence 
that long-run equilibrium demand for the nar- 
row money measure continues to be a stable 
futlctio~l  of relatively few variables. 
The implications of these findi~lgs  for the 
apparent shift in MI velocity are discussed in 
section 111. Section IV reviews the evidence that 
M2  demand is stable in the short run. In section 
V,  the findings on M2  dernand are reconciled 
with evidence that M2  velocity is trend stationary. 
The policy i~nplications  of the common finding 
that money demand is substantially interest sen- 
sitive are analyzed in sections VI and VII. Section 
VIII offers some concluding thoughts. 
I.  TRa!  Demand for MI 
Before  8980 
Until the 1980s, most attention in the money 
demand literature was given to Ml-the  lnoney 
measure that then included currency and non- 
interest-bearing demand deposits. Ftx-us on this 
measure reflected both theoretical and pragmatic 
considerations. First, M1  was the closest measure 
of pure transactions balances and hence con- 
formed well to the concepts embodied in the 
inventory-theoretic model of Baumol(1952) and 
the portfolio-choice theory of Tobin (1958). 
These approaches essentially explained why 
individuals would hold the non-interest-bearing 
components of M1  instead of interest-bearing 
alternatives. 
Perhaps more important, the focus on MI 
seemed justified on empirical grounds. Of the 
various money measures, M1  appeared to be 
most closely related to economic activity, partic- 
ularly in the short run. Movements in M1  served 
as a relatively useful indicator of current and 
future changes in economic activity. Moreover, 
the velocity of MI exhibited a high degree of 
stability. From 1959 to 1980, M1  velocity 
increased at a trend rate of around 3 percent, 
deviating only a few tenths of a percent from 
year to year (see figure 1). 
By  the 1970s,  a conve~ltional  empirical model 
for MI  dernand had evolved.'  Desired real M1 
bala~lces,  nz:  were a function of some scale var- 
iable,  11  either real income or wealth; and a 
measure of the opportunity cost of holding 
money, r, the level of interest rates: 
Earlier studies used a~lnual  data (see Meltzer 
[1963],  Iaidler [ 19661, and Chow  [1966]  ). In 
these studies, the scale variable was typically 
some measure of wealth, and the opportunity 
cost was most often a measure of the long-term 
interest rate. The interest elasticities for MI 
ranged between -0.7 and -0.9.2 
ar;l  1 See, for example, Goldfeld (1973) 
s  2  For a more complete discussion of  earlier sludies, see Havrilesky and 
Boarman (1978), chaplers i and 8. 
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data, perhaps motivated by the increasing availa- 
bility of such data and the development of quar- 
terly econometric models (see Goldfeld [  19731 ). 
It became more common to use real income as 
the scale variable and to use a measure of the 
short-term interest rate as the measure of oppor- 
tunity cost. It was often assumed that in any 
given quarter, money balances adjusted only par- 
tially to their desired (equilibrium) level. The 
adjustment process was specified as 
Disinflation and financial deregulation greatly 
affected the opportunity cost of MI. Disinflation 
resulted in sharply falling interest rates, reversing 
the secular trend that dated back to the 1950s. 
Deregulation allowed banks to compete more 
effectively for funds by offering interest-bearing 
checking accounts and market rates of interest 
on savings and time deposits. The opportunity 
cost of most bank deposits fell markedly after 
1982 when market rates fell and when banks 
priced deposits more competitively. 
I!. MI  Demand  Revisitad 
where A  is the speed of adjustment to equili- 
brium. Substituting equation (1) into (2) yields 
Equation (3) was sometimes estimated in first- 
difference form.3 
The speed of adjustment of MI  balances to 
equilibrium levels was typically estimated to be 
between 0.25 and 0.5 per quarter. The estimates 
of income elasticities of this specification were 
typically around 0.2 in the short run and less 
than unity in the long run. Estimates for interest- 
rate elasticities were around -0.02 in the short 
run and ranged between -0.05 and -0.15 in the 
long run4 
Tfie estimates of  long-run  interest elasticities 
seemed lower than the theories predicted and 
were substantially lower than earlier estimates. 
Given the absence of any evident interest-rate 
effects on M1  velocity and the apparent stability 
of the short-run specifications through the early 
1970s, the smaller estimates of interest elasticity 
appeared to have gained greater acceptance. 
By  the 1980s, however, the quarterly specifica- 
tions for MI  demand failed miserably. This was 
evident in the sharp change in the behavior of 
MI  ~l~ity,  which has varied substantially since 
1980 and exhibits no clear trend. The break- 
down in the conventional relationship is 
believed to be largely a consequence of disinfla- 
tion and financial deregulation.5 
E  8  The inclusion of lagged money was also rat~onalized  on an expecta- 
tional basis (see Havrilesky and Boorman). 
m 4  Some specifications included interest paid on passbook savings depos- 
its as an additional measure of  opportunity cost. 
5  Some economists believe that  the breakdown in the conventional rela- 
tionship was also a consequence of  the change In the Federal Reserve's oper- 
ational procedure in October 1979 and the ~mplications  of  that regime change 
on structural coeff~cients. 
While attempts have been made to rectify M1 
demand in the short run, no consensus appears 
to be forming on any particular specification (see 
Moore, Porter, and Small  [ 19881 ). Many analysts 
now question a~hether  a short-run demand func- 
tion can ever be identified for  On the other 
hand, recent studies by Poole (1988) and by 
Hoffman and Rasche (1989) suggest that the 
long-run (equilibrium) relationship may have 
endured through the past decade. Their specifi- 
cations find that the long-run equilibrium inter- 
est elasticity of MI  demand is substantial. 
Poole offers an explanation for why some 
economists may have been misled from models 
estimated in first-difference form. Such models 
often included a constant term, which made it 
equivalent to a linear-time-trend specification in 
a regression using the levels of the data. Me  con- 
cludes that in the postwar period, the constant 
term incorrectly picked up the trend in velocity, 
which should have been attributed to the post- 
war trend in interest rates. 
This argument fails to explain, however, why 
the regressions for MI  in levels form (without 
time-trend variables) also underestimated inter- 
est elasticities. Closer inspection of the conven- 
tional relationships reveals that part of the trend 
effect of interest rates on MI may have mistakenly 
been attributed to the trend in income. As  noted 
above, the long-run income elasticitywas typically 
estimated to be less than one-often around 
one-half. This, in turn, implied that over long 
periods, velocity would increase at approxi- 
mately half the rate of increase in income, other 
things being equal. Since the conventional esti- 
mate of income elasticity concurred with the  . 
!a  6  Poole (1988) discusses the difficult~es  of identification from a buffer- 
stock perspective of  money demand and concludes that the econometric prob- 
lems may well be ~nsurmountable.  For  a review of  the buffer-stock approach 
to money demand, see  Laidler (1984). 
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ances, many analysts accepted the low estimate 
as a confirmation of the theory? 
To estimate long-run money demand, Poole 
advocates a simple regression of the level of 
velocity on the level of a long-term interest rate 
using annual data. By  excluding income as an 
explanatory variable, Poole implicitly constrains 
the income elasticity to be unitary; hence, any 
potential trend in velocity must be independent 
of any trend in income. 
Poole's case for using a long-term interest rate 
is predicated on the assumption that equilibrium 
money demand would not likely be affected by 
tempora y changes in interest rates in the long 
run. Investment in cash management techniques 
is costly and hence only profitable when interest- 
rate increases are sustained. Since long-term 
rates are believed to embody expectations about 
future short-term rates, a rise in long-term rates is 
likely to indicate a more permanent rise in the 
general level of interest rates. Thus, Poole con- 
cludes, long-term rates better measure the 
opportunity cost of cash. 
Finally, Poole argues that adequate estimates of 
a money-demand function cannot be obtained by 
using postwar data alone. During this period,  both 
short- and long-term rates rose secularly. Thus, 
he uses an extensive sample period, 1915-1986, 
and three different subsamples. He estimates that 
the interest elasticity is around -0.6 for the 
whole period and for various subsamples, which 
is substantially larger than conventional estimates. 
Hoffman and Rasche obtain estimates of a simi- 
lar order of magnitude using a different estima- 
tion and testing method. Unlike Poole, they do 
not constrain the income elasticity to be unitary. 
Their approach-based on the notion of 
cointegration-addresses a potential problem 
related to the statistical properties of the varia- 
bles included in money demand. 
As with most economic variables, MI, interest 
rates, and income are nonstationary in levels. In 
such variables, there is no tendency to systemati- 
cally return to a unique level or trend over time. 
It is now well known that standard regression 
analysis can yield spurious relationships between 
variables when the variables drift over time. 
Methods initially developed by Engle and 
Granger (1987) allow one to examine whether 
equilibrium relationships exist between nonsta- 
tionary variables. Such variables are said to be 
cointegrated, if  some linear combination of them 
is stationary. Thus, cointegration implies a long- 
run equilibrium relationship between variables, 
and one can obtain long-run elasticities from the 
cointegrating vector.8 
Hoffman and Rasche test for cointegration and 
find that 1) real M1  balances and real income are 
not cointegrated by themselves; 2) real MI, real 
income, and the interest rate are cointegrated 
with one cointegrating vector; and 3) one cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of real 
money and real income in the cointegrating vec- 
tor are equal in value but opposite in sign? 
The first result is consistent with the common 
finding that M1  velocity is nonstationary. Since 
both income and money are nonstationary, but 
not cointegrated, their difference will be nonsta- 
tionary. The second result, however, implies a 
stable long-run relationship between money, 
income, and interest rates. The third result 
implies that it is appropriate to interpret the 
cointegrating vector as a linear combination of 
MI velocity and interest rates or, equivalently, 
that the equilibrium real income elasticity of 
demand for real balances is unity. 
To estimate the equilibrium interest-rate elas- 
ticity, Hoffman and Rasche consider both a short- 
term rate (three-month Treasury bill) and a long- 
term rate (10-year Treasury bond). Like Poole, 
they find that the interest elasticity on the long- 
term rate is about -0.6, while somewhat less, 
-0.4, for the short-term rate. Moreover, they find 
that cointegration holds for either of the long- or 
short-term measures. These results are robust 
across subsample periods investigated. 
HI.  MI  Velocity 
in 'Ihe  1980s 
The Hoffman and Rasche findings imply that any 
observed drift in the velocity of Ml should be 
proportional to any drift in nominal interest rates. 
Thus, any shift in the drift of velocity should be 
the mirror image of any shift in the drift of nom- 
inal interest rates. Rasche (1989) investigates this 
last property by examining regressions of the 
changes in the log of MI  velocity and changes in 
the nominal interest rate, each against a constant 
and a dummy variable, which is zero through 
December 1981 and 1.0 thereafter. 
8 For a more precise description of  the concepts of cointegration, see 
Engle and Granger (1987). 
B 7  Other  economic explanations for why an income elasticity might be 
less than one include improvements in cash management technology.  B 9  All variables are in log fon. 
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interest-rate equation and in the velocity equa- 
tion, both in the same direction. Again, the 
results hold for both long- and short-term rates; 
but, because of the high variance in the short- 
term rates, the shift is not measured with any 
precision. Rasche concludes that the abrupt 
change in the pattern of M1  velocity in the early 
1980s was incleed asscxriated with a coincidental 
change in the drift in interest rates. 
Rasche further investigates the hypothesis that 
the observed change in velcxity behavior is a 
result of a break in inflationary expectations. He 
argues that if  the postwar period through 1980 is 
characterized by a steady upward drift in infla- 
tion, then it is reasonable to conjecture that it 
has been asscxriated with the observed positive 
drift in nominal interest rates. Moreover, he 
argues that if inflation expectations stabilized at a 
lower rate in the early 1980s, it is reasonable to 
conclude that there has been no drift in interest 
rates over this period. 
As evidence for a break in the drift of infla- 
tionary expectations, Rasche notes the general 
consistency of the Livingston Survey data. These 
data, which begin in the late 1940s, provide 
annual inflation forecasts formed at the end of 
the previous year. ale  survey reveals a general 
upward trend through 1980 and then a break 
sharply clownwartl. Rasche notes that since 1982, 
the Livingston series has fluctuated without a 
trend in the 3 percent to 5 percent range. 
To summarize, the recent evidence of large 
long-run  interest elasticities of  Ml demand pro- 
vides a basis for understanding the recent shift in 
the trend in veltxrity. W~ile  the evidence points 
to a reasonably stable long-run M1  demand func- 
tion, no one yet seems to have identified a satis- 
factory short-run model. Without a reliable short- 
run model of MI, little can be said about M1 
velocity in the short run. 
IV.  The  Demand for 12 
Recent research on M2 demand provides evi- 
dence of stable specifications for M2  in the short 
run, at least in the postwar period. Moore, Porter, 
and Small (1988) estimate a short-run M2 
demand fu~nction  over the period 1964:IQ to 
1986:IIQ.'O The model is specified in two parts. 
One is an equilibrium money demand function, 
similar to equation (  1 ): 
where  172, =  log (M2), y, =  log (nominal GNP), 
and s = log (opportunity cost). Note that the 
unitary coefficient on nominal GNP assures that 
this also specifies a velocity relationship." The 
second component is a dynamic specification 
based on an error-correction adjustment: 
where e,  _ , is the deviation of money from its 
long-run equilibriu~n  value (derived from  [4]  ) 
and e ,  is white noise. 
Equation (5) essentially specifies the short-run 
convergence process of M2  to its equilibrium 
value. When the coefficient b is negative, con- 
vergence is assured. Substituting equation (4) 
into (5) yields 
(6)  Am,= a-  ha-  bfis,_,+  b(m,_,-y,_,) 
Moore et al. estimate a version of equation (6). 
Simulations, both in-sample and out-of-sample, 
support the hypothesis that M2  demand has 
been and continues to be reasonably stable over 
the whole sample period. 
One key feature of Moore et al. is the way 
opportunity cost is measured. By  definition, the 
opportunity cost of money is the forgone interest 
income of holding a monetary asset. Over the 
years, it has been common to use a market yield 
on a relatively risk-free asset, such as a Treasury 
bill, to measure opportunity cost. For much of 
the postwar period, this seemed appropriate for 
the narrow money measures, since holders of 
currency and demand deposits did not receive 
explicit interest payments on these instruments. 
Many instruments in the broader rnonetary 
aggregates like M2, however, have yielded 
explicit interest. Their yields, when not exceed- 
ing interest-rate ceilings, responded at least par- 
tially to market conditions. Moore et al, measure 
the opportunity cost of these instruments as the 
a 11  Moore el al, include a time index as a regressor to directly estimate 
10  For further evidence concerning the stability of  M2, see Hetzel and  any drift in M2 velocity. While they find the coefficient to be significant, the 
Mehra (1987),  drift is negligible at  around ,003  percent per year. 
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Treasury bill. The opportunity cost of M2  then is 
the weighted average of the opportunity costs of 
each M2  component, where the weights are 
equal to the compo~ient's  share of M2. 
The response of money demand to changes in 
market interest rates in this model requires a 
specification of the relationship of deposit sates 
to the market rates.'* Thus, the interest elasticity 
of money demand now depends on how rapidly 
banks adjust their deposit rates in response to 
changing market rates. To illustrate, consider the 
extreme case where deposit rates respond instan- 
taneously to changes in market rates so as to 
maintain a constant spread between them. In such 
a case, money demand and velocity would be 
unaffected by changes in market interest rates 
because the opportunity cost of money would 
not change. 
If, on the other hand, deposit rates adjust 
insta~itaneously  but only partially to a change in 
interest mtes (that is, not point-for-point), then 
the interest elasticity would be proportio~ial  but 
less than the opportu~iity  cost elasticity. Any 
trend ixi interest rates would also be associated 
with a trend in the opportu~iity  cost of those 
deposits. Equilibrium money demand would 
hence be affected, and the trend in velocity 
wc>uld  be proportional to the trend in the oppor- 
tunity cost of M2. 
Finally, consider a case where deposit rates 
respond sluggishly to changes in open market 
rates. A permanent increase in market interest 
sates would initially be associated with an 
increase in opportunity cost, as market rates 
moved above deposit rates, followed by a 
decrease as deposit sates caught up. If  the de- 
posit sates ultimately adjusted point-for-point, 
the long-run equilibrium level of opportu~iity 
cost would be unaffected. 
Moore et al. speci~  deposit-rate equations to 
be simple linear fu~lctions  of the federal funds 
sate. Ttiey assume that competitive forces ulti- 
mately drive the slope coefficients to equal one 
minus the marginal resenie ratio, and the inter- 
cept to equal some negative value to reflect trans- 
actions costs that are not recovered as fees 
assessed to the depositor. As with M2  demand, 
the short run is formulated within an error- 
correction framework. Cha~iges  in deposit rates 
are assumed to be related to deviations of the 
rates from their long-run equilibrium values, and 
to changes in the current and past values of 
interest sates. 
Moore et al. find that for many components of 
M2, own rates have been relatively slow to 
adjust. This is particularly evident for instruments 
with transactions features such as NOW accounts 
and, to a lesser extent, moriey market deposit 
accounts. On the other hand, some deposit rates, 
such as those on time deposits, have adjusted 
relatively quickly and fully to changes in market 
rates.l3 However, because a significant share of 
M2  deposit rates adjust sluggishly, changes in 
market interest rates have substantial short-run 
effects on the opportunity cost of M2, and con- 
sequently on its demand. 
Indeed, the model estimated by Moore et al. 
suggests that the short-ru?z interest elasticity of 
M2  demand is substantial. What is curious is that 
some bank deposits appear more interest sensi- 
tive than before deregulation. One might expect 
just the opposite, as deregulation allows banks to 
compete more effectively for funds, even if they 
adjust only slowly. 
Some analysts have speculated that the in- 
creased sensitivity of some deposits may reflect 
the increased sophistication of  most deposit- 
holders and the improved communications 
technologies that have made funds transfers 
more convenient. Even if opportunity costs are 
less affected by changes in i~iterest  rates now 
than before, deposit-holders are much more 
aware of alternative assets and therefore are 
more likely to respond to changes in the oppor- 
tunity cost of some deposits.14 
The treatment of opportunity cost as distinct 
from the market interest rate helps to reconcile 
why M2  velocity is trendless despite the 
observed trends in interest rates. This is easiest 
to understand in the case where deposit rates 
ultimately adjust point-for-point with changes in 
market rates. In such a case, opportunity cost is 
by definition stationary around some tre~idless 
differential, and hence would be independent of 
any trend in interest rates. Thus, the velocity of 
these deposits would be insulated from chang- 
ing inflationary expectations. 
a 13  Moore et  al. also conclude that deposit-rate adjustments are asym- 
metric, adjusting more rapidly to upward movements in market rates than to 
rn  12  The advantages of  measuring opporlunity cost as a differential in  downward movements. 
yields are in principle greater since deregulation than before. Currently, there 
are no  inlerest-rate ceilings on  any of  M2's noncurrency and non-demand-  14  However, there appears to be no shift in the  opporlunity cost elastic- 
deposit components, which are 83 percent  of  the  total.  ity of  the  M2 aggregate after deregulation. 
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for-point to changes in interest rates. Reserve 
requirements assure some wedge preventing 
complete adjustment. Also, since currency pays 
no  explicit yield, its opportunity cost is essen- 
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tially equal to the interest rate. Thus, if  the level 
of interest rates exhibits drift, the opportunity 
costs of these components of M2  will also exhibit 
drift in the same direction. M2  velocity would 
not be independent of the level of interest rates. 
In practice, however, the drift in the opportu- 
nity cost of  M2  has been highly muted relative to 
the drift in interest rates (see figure 2). The 
wedge created by reserve requirements is in fact 
small-12 percent or less. Moreover, the share of 
currency and reservable deposits amounts to less 
than 20 percent of  M2; thus, the nonstationary 
component of the opportunity cost would be 
small and perhaps negligible. Interest-rate 
trends, then, would not affect M2  velocity sub- 
stantially in the long run. 
Some evidence indicates that M2  velocity is, in 
the long run, independent of interest rates. Engle 
and Granger (1987) conclude that nominal in- 
come and M2  are cointegrated, implying that M2 
velocity is a stationary process and hence is unaf- 
fected by interest-rate trends. Thus, it would 
appear that M2 velocity is immune to changing 
inflationary expectations in the long run. This 
explains why the M2  velocity trend, unlike that of 
MI, was unaffected by the rise and fall of inflation 
in the postwar period. In the short run, however, 
changes in the opportunity cost of M2  are driven 
largely by changes in market interest rates; and, 
Ratio 
as figure 3 illustrates, M2 velocity is quite closely 
related to the opportunity cost of M2. 
Percent 
7  VI.  Money as rs  Policy 
Gsalda During Oisirelflafllow 
6 
Recent evidence indicating that money demand 
5  is substantially interest sensitive has important 
implications for monetary policy. Interest sensi- 
-";  tivity of  money demand poses serious problems 
for policies that seek to achieve disinflation. 
Poole (1988) concludes, "There is a serious and 
probably insurmountable problem to designing 
a predetermined money growth path to reduce 
1  inflation  ..." (p. 97). 
Poole offers a clear description of the problem: 
0  If  policymakers embark on a credible policy of 
1959  1964  1969  1974  1979  1984  1989  disinflation, they should expect that nominal 
interest rates will ultimately fall as inflatiowary 
SOIIRCE: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.  expectations subside. Consequently, they should 
expect velocity growth to decline, and pkrl~aps 
even become negative, if the policy becomes suc- 
cessful. Under these circumstances, inflation 
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could be reduced without a decline in money 
growth, at least initially. Indeed, a decline in 
money growth might have a significant depress- 
ing effect on the economy. He concludes that 
the gradualist prescription of predetermined 
reductions in money growth would not be politi- 
cally sustainable, as it would likely be associated 
with unnecessary weakness in economic activity. 
Poole further argues that this situation poses a 
serious dilemma for policymakers. How do  they 
convince markets of their commitment to disin- 
flation without a reduction in money growth 
rates? Is it not irrational to bet on lower inflation 
on the basis of a central bank's promises, with no 
evidence that the central bank is reducing money 
growth? Poole concludes that a recession may be 
necessary to convince markets that the central 
bank is committed to a disinflationary policy. 
The problem of targeting money is easy to 
appreciate in the context of M1. After all, few 
analysts anticipated the magnitude of the shift in 
the drift of M1  velocity. Another reduction in 
inflation would likely result in another shift in 
the trend in M1  velocity. Moreover, no  specifica- 
tion for short-run M1  demand seems acceptably 
stable at present. On the other hand, there is no 
evidence that the trend of M2  velocity has been 
affected by the transition to lower inflation in the 
1980s. The recent specification by Moore et al. 
suggests that the short-run demand for M2  may 
be reasonably stable. 
A hypothetical example illustrates how the 
problem applies to a disinflation policy specified 
as a target path for M2. First, assume that on the 
basis of a promise alone, markets could be con- 
vinced of a central bank's commitment to grad- 
ual disinflation from current levels to zero infla- 
tion in 1993.  To the extent that disinflation was 
perfectly anticipated, we might expect that nom- 
inal magnitudes such as interest rates, personal 
consumption expenditure growth, and nominal 
GNP growth would decline smoothly to nonin- 
flationary trend paths.I5 
If  the parameters of the M2  demand function 
estimated by Moore et al. are approximately 
structural, then we would expect M2  demand to 
accelerate initially to growth rates above the 
equilibrium rate of nominal GNP growth and 
then begin to slow (see figure 4). The additional 
money growth would not be for the purpose of 
financing future spending, but would reflect a 
pure portfolio decision to hold a greater propor- 
tion of wealth as bank deposits in response to a 
sharply falling opportunity cost; hence, the 
monetary acceleration could still be associated 
with a slowing in nominal spending. 
The pattern of M2  growth reflects two key fea- 
tures of the M2  demand model. First, own rates 
on deposits adjust slowly enough to changes in 
market rates that the opportunity cost in the 
short run is directly related to changes in the 
level of interest rates.16 Second, M2  demand is 
substantially sensitive to changes in opportunity 
cost. Thus, as interest rates fall with disinflation, 
so does the opportunity cost of M2. It is this 
decline in M2's opportunity cost that induces 
investors to hold additional bank deposits rela- 
tive to their spending needs. 
This example is hypothetical, of course. If 
markets were to maintain an expectation of 
gradual disinflation, they would need to under- 
stand the consequences of a falling opportunity 
cost and have confidence that the estimated 
short-run M2  demand function was reliable. 
Only then might markets reconcile an accelerat- 
ing money-growth path with a disinflation policy. 
m 15  We assume here that in noninflationary equilibrium, growth in nominal 
GNP and personal consumption expenditures equals 3 percent, as does the 
Treasury bill rate, but  that the federal funds rate equals  2% percent. 
s 16  This, of course, presumes that banks have a rational basis for  adjust- 
ing some deposits more sluggishly than others. Thus, although market interest 
rates fully anticipate disinflation, bank depos~ts  would respond with some 
delay. 
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relatively short, however, and it is not evident 
that deposit-rate pricing has stabilized since 
deregulation. It would seem doubtful that 
markets could be convinced of such a strategy. 
Nevertheless, the evidence of substantial 
interest sensitivity of velocity in the short run 
suggests that policymakers might sometimes 
prefer to accommodate the effects of interest-rate 
changes on money demand. During periods of 
disinflation, one might then expect wide swings 
in money growth. Once a disi~lflatio~l  strategy 
becomes credible, velocity could fall substan- 
tially, if  only temporarily, and it would be 
appropriate for policymakers to accommodate 
the consequent surge in money demand. 
VII.  intarest Sensitiviv 
and  Monklta~  Rules 
Apart from the problems that arise during disin- 
flation, the evidence that M2  is more interest-sate 
sensitive than previously thought raises some 
interesting issues concerning monetary rules. On 
the one hand, shcxks to money demand would 
have smaller real consequences under a 
constant-money-growth rule than previously 
thought. Consider a positive shtxk to money 
demand. Given an inelastic money supply, inter- 
est rates would need to rise and output would 
need to fall. In conventional macroeconomic 
models, interest rates would respond initially. 
Higher interest rates would, in turn, tend to slow 
economic activity. When the interest elasticity of 
money dernanci is high, smaller interest-rate 
changes are required to offset demand shocks, 
implying smaller adjustments in output. 
On the other hand, the consequences of non- 
monetary shocks under a constant-money-growth 
rule are less clear when the demand for money 
(and hence velocity) is highly interest-elastic. 
This longstanding issue is illustrated simply in a 
debate between Johtlso~l  (1965) and Friedman 
(1966). Johnson argued that interest-sensitive 
money demand militated against a constant- 
monetary-growth rule "...because variations in 
interest rates generated by the real sector would 
make such a rule automatically destabilizing  ..." 
(p. 397). Implicitly, Johnson assumed that varia- 
tions in interest rates would be a natural by- 
product of stable output growth; in turn, these 
variations would cause prtxyclical variations in 
velocity, which, under the assumption of con- 
stant money growth, would produce fluctuations 
in the rate of nominal income growth. 
Friedman acknowledged this potential out- 
come, but argued that the conditions assumed 
by Johnson were highly special. Essentially, 
Friedman conte~lded  that while velocity would 
tend to move with nominal output, a constant- 
money-growth rule would nevertheless dampen 
output fluctuations relative to "discretionary" 
policies. Thus, Friedrnan was not comparing his 
rule to an ideal rule, but to the existing practice 
of the central bank. 
It is useful to separate this debate into two 
issues. The first is the general issue of rules ver- 
sus discretion. The second is the question of 
whether monetary rules (or targets) should 
allow for some kind of systematic (that is, auto- 
matic) feedback to account for interest-rate 
changes and, hence, shifts in velocity. More spe- 
cifically, should a rule or targeting procedure 
anticipate changes in interest rates?  This first 
issue is only indirectly relevant to the question 
of interest-rate sensitivity and therefore is not 
dealt with here."  The question of feedback, on 
the other hand, is relevant whether a policy 
admits some discretior1 or not. 
The feedback issue depends on the kinds of 
shocks that occur and on the poorly understood 
dynamics of adjustment in the economy. Specifi- 
cally, it depends on where shtxks arise in the 
economy, what their relative magnitudes are, 
and how they are propagated through the econ- 
omy. The answers to these questio~ls  depend on 
the particular model one believes is appropriate 
for characterizing the economy. Unfortunately, 
no consensus exists or even seems immi~lent. 
One large and influential class of empirical 
models, sharing a common propagation mecha- 
nism, casts some doubt on the efficacy of cofz- 
stant monetary-growth rules. In these mcxlels, 
the inflation process is characterized by an 
output-gap acceleratio~list  mechanism: 
where d is the inflation rate, q is the level of 
output, q* is full-employment output, and z 
represents other factors. If  z is constant, a 
change it1 the inflation rate depends on the out- 
put gap. When output exceeds full-employment 
output (that is, when unemployment is below its 
natural rate), inflation accelerates. When output 
is below full-employ~ne~lt  output, inflation  , 
decelerates. Anderson and Enzler (1987) explain 
the consequences of such a mechanism for a 
monetary rule: 
@a  17  For  a discussion of  the general issue of rules versus discrelion, see 
Carlson (1988). 
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rate constant might not result in a stable simula- 
tion path for a macromodel containing this ~nech- 
anism. The fixed money growth path predeter- 
mines both the rate of inflation ancl the price 
level consistent with the economy's steacly-state 
path at each point of time. Consider what 
happens if the price level is disturbed up~varcl 
from the steacty-state  growth path. The dema~lci 
for money is increased ancl interest rates rise. This 
depresses output ancl increases unemployment. 
The increased unemployment, in turn, clepresses 
the rate of change of prices. As long as the price 
Ic.~!c.l  remains too high, a force is created that 
tends to keep unemployment above its natural 
rate and the mte of  itzflatio?~  continues to fall. 
The declining 12te  of inflation e\~entually  returns 
the price level to its steady-state value, ancl this in 
turn allows the unemployment rate to return to 
the natural rate, but at this point in  flation  is too 
low to be consistent with the fixed money growth 
path anrl the price level falls through the steady- 
state level. This reduces the clemancl for money, 
causing interest rates to fall until unemploy~l~ent 
is below the natural rate. Inflation then acceler- 
ates until at some point it reaches its steady-state 
value. But nonl the 1er;c.l  of prices is too low. The 
mirror image of  the previous events takes place 
and overshooting occurs again. (p. 297) 
While the estimated parameters of these models 
suggest that the cycle described above eventually 
converges, the process is generally only slightly 
danlpened.'8 
Because the estimated interest elasticity of 
output in these models is typically relatively 
small, it is likely that a higher interest elasticity of 
money demand would only attenuate the cycles 
of such models. To illustrate this point, consider 
again the propagation of the upward price ciis- 
turbance. The higher the interest elasticity of 
money demand, the lower the rise in the level of 
the interest rate that would result as an effect of 
the price shock on money demanded, given an 
inelastic supply. However, because the interest- 
rate elasticity of output is low, the consequent 
effect on output would be even smaller, and 
would hence slow the process that dampens the 
shock to inflation.lP 
Evidence of a potential for long macroeco- 
nomic cycles is not a unique consequence for 
models with an output-gap mechanism. Indeed, 
m  18  It should be noted that these models typically do not result in a 
trade-off between inflation and unemployment in the long run. 
19  It is perhaps ironic that these models suggest that a constant-money- 
growth rule would result in an interest-rate path that is too smooth to substan- 
tially dampen shocks lo inflation over reasonably short horizons. Indeed, these 
models suggest lhat rather large and sustained increases in interest rates 
would be required to substantially affect  the output gap and hence the inflation 
raie. However, il is uncommon to f~nd  antagonists of  the money-growth rule 
who cite this evidence and also publicly advocate the kind of interest-rate 
variation that large models suggest is required to stabilize the inflation rate. 
some simple models linking money and prices 
also exhibit long cycles. One example is a recent 
single-equation model estimated by Hallman, 
Porter, and Small (1989). Theirs is a reduced- 
form model of the relationship between inflation 
and M2 that does not explicitly include either 
the current level of output or employment as a 
variable.20  While they find rather lengthy adjust- 
ments to simulated shocks (for example, more 
than 100 years), the cycles of their model are 
more damped than those of many large macro- 
economic models. 
From a deterministic point ofview, the Hallman 
et al. results suggest that there is a nonconstant 
money-growth path consistent with a relatively 
smooth transition to equilibrium. As they note, 
inflation, in equilibrium, could be controlled at 
any constant rate with constant growth of M2. 
Notwithstanding the well-known critique of 
Lucas (1776), the use of deterministic siinulations 
as evidence in the debate about an appropriate 
policy rule is of only limited value. A critical 
issue in this debate is how a rule performs in a 
stochastic framework, one that approximates the 
distribution of disturbances that have historically 
affected the various sectors of the economy. In 
this context, the issue is not the selection of an 
appropriate policy response to a particular shock, 
but the robustness of a contractual commitment 
to a policy rule in responding to a series  of likely 
outcomes arising from a typical distribution. 
One sense of robustness has been stressed by 
McCallum (1788): that a rule perform well for a 
variety of models, preferably ones incorporating 
alternative views of macroeconomic relation- 
ships. It is important to establish robustness (in 
this sense) because no structural model of the 
economy enjoys sufficiently wide acceptance; 
nor does any consensus seem to be evolving. 
Thus, to gain acceptance for a proposed rule, the 
rule advocate must demonstrate that the rule 
would lead to reasonably good outcomes for var- 
iables of interest and for a variety of models.21 
r+~ 20  Nevertheless, the model incorporates estimates of full employment 
output and equil~brium  velocity as determinants of the equilibrium price level. 
In lhis model, inflation is a function of  the gap between the cunent price level 
and its equilibrium level. 
s 21  One method of simulation designed to address this issue is suggested 
by Tinsley and von zur  Muehlen (1983). They essentially offer a technique to 
generate unplanned disturbances consistent with the error structure observed 
in historical experience. The robustness of a policy rule is tested by multiple 
simulations of the performance of  the rule over multiyear periods, where each 
simulation draws a different series or  "history" of unplanned disturbances. The 
horizons are chosen to be long enough to allow significant differences to 
emerge among the alternative policies and to assure that policies ultimately 
stabilize outcomes. 
The sum of simulation results provides distributions of ouicomes for each of 
the model's variables. For  Instance, one policy may be associated with a wide 
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obtain. Moreover, a test for robustness is an 
open-ended search, encompassing an endless 
variety of both rules and models. As a conse- 
quence, evidence from this analysis is in only an 
embryonic state. Preliminary results by Tinsley 
and von zur Muehlen (1983) and Anderson and 
Enzler (1987) suggest, however, that monetary 
rules do not perform as well as alternative rules 
or intermediate targeting procedures. Neverthe- 
less, the monetary rules and targeting procedures 
examined were based on older, less interest- 
sensitive estimates of money demand. 
The ongoing debate over the efficacy of a 
constant-money-growth  rule, when the interest 
elasticity of money demand is large, is not likely 
to be resolved without some convincing empiri- 
cal basis. Thus, it would seem appropriate for 
policymakers to take account of the conse- 
quences of expected interest-rate changes on 
velocity when choosing target ranges for M2  over 
a period of a year or less. That is, it may be 
appropriate for M2  growth to slow substantially 
when interest rates are rising and expected to 
rise further, or to accelerate substantially when 
interest rates fall. 
Vill.  Cews;lasdlwg 
Comments 
One common finding of recent empirical 
research in monetary economics is that the 
interest elasticity of money demand is estimated 
to be substantial, and higher than many econo- 
mists previously thought. The evidence seems 
strongest for M1  demand in the long run. While 
interest rates have little long-term effect on M2, 
the short-run elasticity seems to be greater than 
previously thought. 
When the interest elasticity of money demand 
is high, velocity can vary widely. This creates a 
problem for using money as a policy guide. 
Monetary targets should take into account the 
consequences of expected changes in interest 
rates on money demand. This problem is per- 
haps most difficult during periods of disinflation, 
when changing expectations about inflation 
result in large swings in interest rates and hence 
in velocity. 
Finding that a money-demand function is stable 
is not a sufficient basis for adopting a constant- 
money-growth rule. The rule advocate has the 
burden of convincing others that the stabilizing 
effects of the monetaq7  rule would outweigh the 
potentially destabilizing effects of maintaining 
constant money growth when velocity varies sys- 
tematically with interest rates. Because no con- 
sensus exists about the best model for the econ- 
omy, the rule advocate must argue his case in 
the context of a variety of models. 
The challenge of examining rule robustness 
has been recognized and addressed by McCallum 
(1988). It is hoped that others will follow his 
lead. Recent developments in simulation 
methods offer promising approaches for examin- 
ing the robustness of alternative policy rules. 
range of outcomes for output and Interest rates, but  with a small range for 
prices and money for any glven simulation horizon. Another policy may be 
associated with small ranges for interest rates and money, but  with large 
ranges for prices and outpul, or  vice versa. Tinsley and von zur  Muehlen note, 
"...the essential contribution of stochastic simulation analysis is Ihe empirical 
pemise Ihat while individual unplanned disturbances cannot be  predicted (by 
definition), their ranges of probable outcomes are unlikely to differ significanlly 
from the dispersions observed in historical experience ..." (p.16). 
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